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Kenneth M. Cuno
Nearly half a century ago, in the heyday of Parsonian functionalism, the sociologist William J. Goode argued that industrialization and 
urbanization were promoting similar changes in family life globally.1 The 
trend was toward the “conjugal family,” which also happened to be the 
ideal family form in the late-twentieth-century West. The conjugal fam-
ily consists of a couple and their children. Its members are free of formal 
obligations toward elders or an extended kin group, and its children are 
relatively autonomous in their choice of spouses. Subsequent developments 
cast Goode’s perspective in doubt. Historians discovered that such families, 
rather than being a consequence of industrialization and urbanization, were 
predominant in Northwestern Europe centuries earlier. Since then there has 
been growing recognition that the “modern” conjugal family is to some 
extent an idealized version of the historic Northwest European pattern. 
Nor has the conjugal family triumphed in every newly industrializing and 
urbanizing society. It is even losing its preeminence in Europe and North 
America, which, ironically, have begun to deviate from the “modern” ideal. 
Nevertheless, the conjugal family ideal continues to be central to discourses 
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of modernity. Moreover, its promotion in place of alternate family forms, 
especially in non-western societies, has often been justified by the associa-
tion of the conjugal family with relatively higher status for women. 
Each of the books under review addresses the question of historical 
change in family forms, what promoted change and the implications of 
such change for women. The role of the modern regulatory state and of 
the law in promoting change in family systems, both intentionally and in-
advertently, is another common theme. Göran Therborn, a sociologist, and 
Arland Thornton, a demographer, offer studies of global change that cover 
some of the same ground but differ in perspective. Therborn is interested in 
measuring major long-term shifts in family systems, while Thornton focuses 
on the influence of developmentalist ideas in promoting these and other 
changes in family life. Historians Tamara Loos, Brett Shadle, and Mytheli 
Sreenivas present case studies of the re-envisioning of family life and the 
rewriting of family law in Siam, Kenya, and India that both amplify and 
complicate the issues raised by Therborn and Thornton.
Göran Therborn’s Between Sex and Power presents a “global history of 
the family” since 1900 in three thematic sections that address the decline of 
patriarchy, the changing roles and meanings of marriage, and changes in 
fertility. Each section compares the past century’s developments within five 
major family systems: sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and North America, East 
Asia, South Asia, and West Asia-North Africa. There also are two interstitial 
systems: Southeast Asia, where Confucianism, Islam, and Catholicism are 
“moderated” by Buddhism and Malay customs; and “Creole” (Latin) Amer-
ica, where African, European, and Native American cultures melded. 
Therborn’s dominant theme is the retreat of patriarchy—the power 
wielded by elder men over women and younger men—as sanctioned in 
laws governing marriage and the rights of women, men, and children within 
the family. Indices of fathers’ and husbands’ authority, such as patrilocal 
marriage, arranged marriage, polygyny, and formalized rules of wives’ 
and children’s obedience, eroded the most in liberal Europe and North 
America, followed by Eastern Europe and East Asia. Twenty-first century 
Europe and North America have reached “post-patriarchy,” which Therborn 
defines as “adult autonomy from parents and equal male-female family 
rights,” though not necessarily gender equality (127). Patriarchy remains 
entrenched in much of South, Central, and West Asia, and Northern and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Trends in marriage and fertility show a similar uneven-
ness. Northwestern Europe and its cultural extensions were and remain 
different from the rest, with relatively later and less universal marriage, 
and greater autonomy in the choice of spouses by the young. Since 1970, 
the West has also distinguished itself with high divorce rates and a decline 
in formal marriage (partly due to informal partnering). Toward the end of 
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the century fertility was declining worldwide, but the trend was much more 
pronounced, again, in the West. 
Therborn rejects the essentially materialist modernization paradigm 
of Goode, placing more emphasis on the role of ideology and sociopo-
litical movements. Secularization and democratization contributed to 
“de-patriarchalization.” At the beginning of the century, a still largely 
rural and pre-industrial Scandinavia took the lead in enacting egalitarian 
family laws. The feminist movement, socialism in all its forms, secular 
liberalism (“mainly of Protestant Christian or Jewish—seldom Catholic—
provenance” [77]) and anticolonial nationalism all acted to erode patriarchy. 
Despite his rejection of the modernization paradigm and his often nuanced 
empirical discussion, the old traditional/modern dichotomy creeps back 
in. “Post-patriarchy” is the telos in this global history of the family, and as 
with Goode’s supposedly triumphal conjugal family, the trend is toward 
greater individual autonomy, especially for women and youth. Therborn 
attributes the resilience of patriarchy in West Asia and North Africa to “re-
ligious backlash” against “secular modernization” and “the weakness and 
venality of the secular forces” that are held in check by American–Israeli 
hegemony, an uncharacteristically simplistic argument (115). The resilience 
of patriarchy in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa is simply not explained. 
The contribution of secularism to “de-patriarchalization” is also debatable, 
since religion continues to be influential in the postpatriarchal United 
States. Similarly, the uneven path of liberal-democratic and communist 
states toward egalitarian family law belies a simple connection between 
democratization and “de-patriarchalization.” 
Arland Thornton’s Reading History Sideways is an exposition of the 
influence of developmentalist thought on the study of family life and in 
promoting family change. In it, he argues two main points. The first is that 
the study of the family has been strongly influenced by a “developmental 
paradigm,” or “a model of history that assumes that all societies are on the 
same pathway or trajectory of change, with each going through the same 
stages of development” (3). The corollary, “reading history sideways,” is 
Thornton’s term for the European tendency to attribute differences between 
their own and other societies to different stages of development. Enlighten-
ment and post-Enlightenment scholars read history sideways “to construct 
versions of, or myths about, the history of family life in the Western world,” 
the most important of which was the transition from complex family forms 
to conjugal or nuclear families due to industrialization (6). As I noted ear-
lier, this supposed transition was a pillar of the modernization paradigm 
upheld by Goode’s generation of scholars. Thornton amply documents the 
influence of developmentalist thinking in the foundational scholarship of 
Locke, Malthus, Le Play, Morgan, and Westermarck on the family. Begin-
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ning with the Scottish Enlightenment, the status of women was identified 
as an indicator of social progress. Not only foot binding, widow immola-
tion, and female infanticide were condemned, but also polygyny, veiling, 
child marriage, and divorce. The performance of heavy labor by women 
was disapproved, and drew comparisons between the status of women 
and slaves. Similar ideas informed early feminist writings. John Stuart Mill 
asserted in “The Subjection of Women” (1869) that the condition of women 
was “the surest test and most correct measure of the civilization of a people 
or an age” (166). 
Thornton’s second argument is that the developmental paradigm has 
been a force for change in many areas of the world. As has been noted, 
social scientists understood the Northwest European family pattern to be 
an effect as well as a cause of modernity. The “modern” family system is 
thus “one that emphasizes individualism, the high status of women, mature 
marriage, marriages arranged by the couple, the autonomy of children, and 
small households consisting primarily of parents and children ... in contrast 
to a traditional family with an emphasis on the family collective, little indi-
vidualism, large households, parents and children sharing residences with 
grandparents and married aunts and uncles, marriages arranged by parents, 
a young age at marriage, and the low status of women” (8). The supposed 
causal relationship between modern family life and modern (“industrialized, 
urbanized, highly educated, highly knowledgeable, and wealthy”) society 
gave it a powerful appeal. While industrial society requires no particular 
family system, “the desire for social and economic improvement” and the 
perception of such a connection have motivated change (159). 
Rather than wholesale adoption of the Western family model, the result 
has usually been hybridization, along with resistance to what are perceived 
to be alien cultural values. But even nativist assertions of indigenous fam-
ily values tend to be influenced by developmental idealism, for example 
Islamist writings that endorse women’s education and monogamous and 
companionate marriage (237). Colonial, non-colonial, and postcolonial 
governments have all promoted “modern” family ideals through educa-
tion and the media. 
Therborn and Thornton demonstrate, in different ways, the impact 
of developmental idealism in shaping “modern” family life through legal 
reforms, education, and the media. The colonial conditions in which those 
ideas and reforms spread do not receive particular emphasis. The latter 
three books under review focus on the creation of legal structures and the 
writing of legislation governing the family in the context of colonial mo-
dernity. In their studies of Siam (renamed Thailand in 1939), Kenya, and 
India, Loos, Shadle, and Sreenivas observe how the imposition and adapta-
tion of European legal structures and norms have had a significant impact 
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on family life—indeed, a common theme is the intervention of the state in 
defining and regulating family relationships. Each author shows how the 
process of legal change was politically determined, and not a simple matter 
of “progress” and “modernization.” Each discusses the corollary use—by 
colonial officials and indigenous reformers as well as conservatives—of the 
idea that a society’s cultural essence is located in the domestic realm; hence 
the debate over family law often turned on the preservation or recovery of 
indigenous “tradition.” The authors eschew narratives of foreign dominance 
and national resistance, showing that indigenous actors played a role along 
with international or colonial officials in constructing the modern legal 
systems in Thailand, Kenya, and India, and that none of those groups was 
uniform or unchanging in its outlook. 
Loos’ Subject Siam is a study of the construction of modern Siamese/
Thai subjectivity, central to which, she argues, are relations of gender, pub-
lic law, and the position of the Malay Muslim minority. Siam was one of a 
handful of non-Western countries including Turkey, Japan, and China that 
were never formally colonized, yet which adopted legal systems in confor-
mity with the “civilized” standards of Europe, out of a desire to remove the 
unequal treaties imposed on them by the Euro-American powers and to be 
accepted as equals in international relations. The Bowring Treaty of 1855 
imposed a regime of legal extraterritoriality for the citizens of “civilized” 
states that remained in place until after the completion of Siam’s Civil and 
Commercial Code in 1935. The laws governing the family and inheritance 
were the last parts of the Code completed. The new family law made 
monogamy the accepted form of marriage, as was done earlier in Meiji 
Japan and republican Turkey, and later in communist China. However, 
an exception was made in the four southern provinces bordering Malaya, 
where the family affairs of the Muslim population are adjudicated under 
a version of Islamic law. 
Legal pluralism, according to Loos, is “a hallmark of colonial states” 
(74). It is a hierarchical system that subjects different parts of a population 
(ethnically or religiously defined) to different laws. Although Siam was not 
colonized, its sovereignty was constrained by the regime of legal pluralism 
imposed by the unequal treaties; yet Siam also imposed legal pluralism 
in its Muslim provinces.2 Whereas the norms for commercial, criminal, 
and civil law were considered universal, in colonial and ethnographic 
discourse—and often in anti-colonial, nationalist discourse—religious and 
family practices were regarded as sources of cultural identity and social 
stability. Thus the colonial powers, with some exceptions, did not target the 
religious and family practices of their subjects for reform. Nor did they use 
their influence in non-colonized states like Siam to induce reforms in family 
life, unlike the pressure they brought to bear in favor of the codification of 
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criminal, commercial, and civil law. However, as Thornton also noted, the 
persistence of practices that deviated from the bourgeois European family 
ideal marked these societies as backward—as comparatively less evolved 
than Western societies. Loos writes: “As in directly colonized countries, 
jurisdiction over Siam’s Buddhist-derived laws on divorce, polygynous 
marriage, adultery, and inheritance was protected from Westernized legal 
intervention. However, the same practices that were sheltered from change 
because they reflected the allegedly authentic cultural identity of the Sia-
mese were ideologically deployed by foreign powers as evidence of Siam’s 
uncivilized status. This justified the perpetuation of a plural legal system, 
which granted legal and economic privileges to many foreigners, Asian and 
European, in Siam” (100). At the beginning of the twentieth century the 
Siamese monarchy applied the same logic in creating a system of Islamic 
family law courts for the Muslim provinces, which would eventually work 
alongside the national court system. Separate courts were not demanded 
by the Muslims at the time, and they were hardly traditional. Following 
the examples of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies they applied a 
mixture of Islamic law and custom (adat). But over time, the Islamic courts 
became so integral to the identity of Thai Muslims that they protested the 
temporary removal of them in the 1940s.
A similar process of “traditionalization” occurred in discussions of the 
family and the practice of polygyny among the Buddhist majority in Siam. 
Here (as in Japan, Turkey, and China), a segment of the indigenous elite 
advocated reform of the family as necessary for the modernization of the 
society, and their efforts produced resistance from other elements claiming 
to defend the authentic indigenous culture and its practices. Like Islam 
and Hinduism, Buddhism in Siam favored no particular form of marriage, 
though polygyny was integral to the premodern political system. Royal 
polygyny insured a pool of princes to serve in the administration, and “men 
in positions of power formed political alliances with one another through 
polygynous marriages and demonstrated masculine virility through their 
numerous wives and children” (7). The political role of polygyny declined 
with the development of the modern state and the growth of a cadre of civil 
servants of commoner origin produced through education. However, the 
civil servants adopted polygyny due to its association with official power. 
Though it was strongly criticized in the indigenous press and by foreign-
ers, the kings’ ministers were reluctant to tamper with a social practice 
that conservatives now defended as part of traditional culture. It was only 
after a coup ended the absolute monarchy that a newly established parlia-
ment passed the 1935 law making monogamy the only legitimate form of 
marriage. 
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Public (and intramural governmental) debates over polygyny were 
most intense in the two and a half decades before the family law. King 
Vajiravudh (r. 1910–25) took a leading role in it, promoting an ideal mod-
ern family as a prototype for the nation. Before 1935, a married woman 
was recognized as a major wife if her marriage was arranged through her 
guardians and bridewealth was paid. Minor wives “included those obtained 
through sexual intercourse, short-term liaison, and cohabitation, even in 
some cases in which the woman did not consent” (138). Slave wives were 
women redeemed from indebtedness and supported by their husbands. 
The status of a wife as major or minor determined her inheritance portion 
and the rank of her children. This situation became confused by the early 
twentieth century. Slavery was abolished by 1905, though this appears to 
have contributed to the number of women working in brothels, as the for-
mer slaves sought to support themselves. The growing number of salaried 
officials also increased the demand for commercial sex. The court cases 
Loos examined illustrate the problems arising from the ambiguity of what 
constituted marriage. In his laws governing the behavior of government 
officials and in his public writings, Vajiravudh, while not outlawing po-
lygyny, drew a sharp line between legitimate wives (and hence virtuous 
women) and other liaisons with disreputable women. Laws governing the 
use of names and forms of address more closely defined women according 
to their marital status. 
Siam’s official adoption of monogamy in 1935 could be read as the tri-
umph of Western-inspired modernity. However, as Thornton notes, Western 
family ideals were rarely adopted in their entirety, and the modern Thai 
family system retained elements of preexisting practices. As in the Turkish 
republic, monogamy became the only legitimate form of marriage but plural 
marriage was not criminalized. Men continued to have minor wives and 
children born out of wedlock were legitimized. 
The title of Brett Shadle’s study of the marriage system in the Gusiiland 
region of Kenya under British rule comes from a colonial official’s reference 
to elopements, abductions, rapes, and runaway women as “girl cases.” The 
infantilizing reference was to marriage-aged women. The bidding up of 
bridewealth, which put marriage beyond the reach of many young men, 
caused an upsurge of such cases from the late 1930s through the early 1960s. 
The increase in bridewealth, traditionally paid in cattle, was a consequence 
of colonial capitalist development, which raised the incomes of certain well-
positioned households above most others. Young women’s right of consent 
in marriage was at stake in the resulting “girl cases.” 
Marriage was nearly universal in Gusii society. One’s success in life was 
measured in “wealth and people.” “The basic building block was marriage, 
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from which sprang legitimate children, agricultural surplus, a polygamous 
homestead, and perhaps clients” (1). Bridewealth legitimated marriage, 
and it should be sufficient to enable the bride’s brother or father to marry, 
hence in normal times the number of cattle given as bridewealth tended to 
equalize. Although feminist campaigners in interwar Britain equated bride-
wealth with the “sale” of women, akin to enslaving them, women exercised 
consent in more than one way in the pre-colonial system. In addition to the 
payment of bridewealth, marriages were solemnized in a later ceremony 
called enyagi. Prior to enyagi a father could end the marriage by returning 
the bridewealth, or a woman could refuse to go through with the enyagi 
ceremony. A woman could elope with a lover, and her marriage might be 
legitimated later by her father’s agreement to accept bridewealth. If all else 
failed a woman wanting to avoid an undesired marriage or unhappily mar-
ried could run away to a clan on poor terms with her husband’s or father’s 
clan. “With no overarching authority in the precolonial highlands, fathers 
and husbands had little chance of tracking down a woman who had run 
to an enemy clan” (140).
Colonial rule brought such “overarching authority” to Gusiiland in 
the early twentieth century. Indirect Rule empowered senior African men 
to a greater extent than before. Chiefs exercised legitimate coercion in the 
form of club-wielding askaris (police). Local Native Councils, established in 
1925, levied taxes, regulated markets, and made decisions on infrastructural 
spending. In 1937, the native courts were reorganized and given the power 
to enforce “customary law,” which was constructed using African elders as 
informants. During the bridewealth crisis and the upsurge in “girl cases,” 
African fathers and husbands could rely on the state to enforce their author-
ity over younger men and women. Abductors were prosecuted by fathers 
and their victim daughters. In cases of elopement a man could be charged 
with adultery, which was criminalized in the 1930s, and runaway women 
were “dragged” back to their fathers and husbands by the police. 
Interwar policy aimed to maintain the stability of “traditional” African 
societies, even while transforming them economically. Family stability was 
believed to be the key to that, hence officials were concerned to support the 
enforcement of “customary law,” even when it deviated from British norms. 
Functionalist anthropology supported the logic of preserving “tribes,” which 
was understood to mean preserving patriarchal authority. “The power se-
niors wielded over juniors, and men over women, was [believed to be] the 
glue by which societies and tribes were held together” (49). Missionaries’ 
complaints about the restrictions enforced on African women, including 
the “dragging” of runaway women back to their fathers and husbands, 
stimulated a campaign in Britain against their “enslavement.” As in Siam, 
the debate over family law pitted reformers against preservationists among 
Journal of Women’s History290 Winter
Africans as well as the British. Each side appealed to an idealized vision of 
the family and of its role in society. After the Second World War, colonial 
policy shifted from preserving traditional society to prioritizing develop-
ment, and put new emphasis on the welfare and education of women. At that 
point, colonial administrators ceased to allow the forcible return of runaway 
women. Substantive reform in family law could not be attempted until 
independence, due to the colonial authorities’ disinclination to intervene 
directly in this area. However, post-independence efforts to enact a family 
law have been hampered by the defenders of African patriarchal “tradi-
tions,” some of which are colonial legacies, as Shadle’s work shows.
The Tamil speaking region, formerly part of the Madras Presidency 
and today’s Tamil Nadu province, is the site of Mytheli Sreenivas’ Wives, 
Widows, and Concubines, a study of the conjugal family ideal in modernist 
debates in colonial India. Successive chapters discuss the decoupling of 
family and politics and the redefinition of family and kin under colonial 
rule, the merchant and professional classes’ adoption of the conjugal family 
ideal, alternate constructions of modern marriage promoted by Indian and 
Dravidian nationalists, and the promotion of emotional bonds in marriage 
by women’s magazines. These debates “produced new normative visions 
of family life” and “rearticulated” the status of women (6).
Under colonial rule the patriarchal, joint family households of the elite 
ceased to do political work, becoming landlord zamindari families. The fam-
ily was subsequently redefined through legal intervention brought on by 
disputes over inheritance rights to the jointly held property. The courts now 
distinguished legitimate wives and their children from “concubines” and 
their children on the basis of whether a proper marriage ceremony had been 
performed. The drawing of new boundaries between legitimate wives and 
less respectable consorts, with consequences for legitimacy and heirship, is 
comparable to what occurred in Siam under Vajiravudh. And as in Siam, 
even the relatively privileged legal wives were disadvantaged, for within the 
zamindari class the restriction of land titles to men “empower[ed] upper caste 
men vis-à-vis upper caste women as well as lower castes of both genders” 
(27). The colonial government allied with the zamindari class, upholding 
joint property based upon a selective reading of Hindu scriptures.
The emergent Tamil mercantile and professional classes adopted the 
ideal of “a smaller family, centered on the property and affective relations 
of a monogamous husband and wife” (46). They backed the failed Hindu 
Coparceners’ Partition Bill, introduced in the Madras legislature in 1916, 
which would have allowed a co-owner to separate his share unilaterally 
from a jointly owned property. Proponents of the bill associated individual 
ownership with economic development, modernity and the conjugal family. 
They placed the conjugal couple ahead of the husband’s agnatic relations, 
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raising the possibility of women inheriting property in the absence of male 
heirs. In 1917, they petitioned to have the Married Women’s Property Act of 
1874 apply to Hindu women (the original act exempted Hindus, Muslims, 
Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains). Though invoking women’s right to property 
ownership, this was an all-male discourse that did not envision women as 
“agents or subjects” (55).
After the First World War, conjugality was “embedded in the language 
of nationalist politics” (67). Indian nationalists focused their efforts on 
eliminating child marriage by raising the age of consent, which was set at 
age fourteen for girls in 1929. Dravidian nationalists took aim at marriage 
itself. The Self Respect Marriage movement rejected Brahmanic rituals in 
favor of a simple ceremony centering on the marital vows, which empha-
sized consent. However, the courts would only recognize as legitimate a 
marriage performed according to the traditional rituals, and the movement 
lost impetus before independence. As in Siam and in Africa, family ideals 
were justified with appeals to the ancient, precolonial culture. Nationalist 
reformers “selectively appropriate[ed] Brahmanical norms to recuperate an 
Indian ‘tradition’ of monogamy” (44), and women’s rights groups asserted 
that in the past Hindu women occupied a “high place” and had property 
rights (58). “Orthodox” Hindus rejected raising the age of consent, argu-
ing that pre-puberty marriage was essential to Hinduism, along with the 
joint family. 
Eschewing a progressive interpretation, Sreenivas notes that the con-
jugal family did not completely eclipse the joint family. In an important 
correction to Goode, Therborn, and Thornton, moreover, she contests the 
association of the conjugal family with women’s emancipation. The conju-
gal family ideal was invoked to challenge the patriarchal joint family, but 
“the emphasis on conjugality did not overthrow the power of men within 
their families. Instead, in some cases the new norms even solidified their 
control” (7). 
These three monographs share a number of themes and emphases 
which could be the basis of further comparative studies. Three examples 
will have to suffice here. One important theme is that the polygynous joint 
family households of the elite were integral to the precolonial political order 
in Siam and India, and to the socioeconomic order in stateless precolonial 
Gusiiland. “Polygyny performed vital political work,” in Loos’s apt words 
(102, 110).3 The (re)construction of modern states—that is, states on the Eu-
ropean model—entailed the privatization of the family, its separation from 
politics and its subjection to state regulation. Political power “was no longer 
constituted in and through relations among households,” as Sreenivas put it 
(18). The decoupling of family and politics arguably made polygyny obsolete 
and strengthened the valence of the conjugal family ideal. This connection 
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between structural political change and family reform was not noticed by 
Therborn or Thornton, and it deserves much more attention.
Another theme common to the three studies is the distinction that 
increasingly was drawn between legitimate wives (and hence respectable 
women) and other consorts as modern family law systems developed. In 
Siam and Gusiiland a proper marriage was contingent on the payment of 
bridewealth, and there as well as in India it also required a proper ceremony. 
These distinctions were sharpened even in Kenya, where elopement was 
branded and for a time criminalized as “adultery.” It thus appears that if the 
status of some women was elevated with the legal institution of monogamy, 
other women were defined as disreputable and received less protection from 
the courts. Moreover, as Sreenivas emphasizes, patriarchy did not disappear 
in the modern conjugal family, but was reconstituted.
One other common theme that should be highlighted is the transforma-
tive impact that the imposition or adoption of European legal structures and 
procedures had on the adjudication of family law. This was most marked 
in India and Kenya, where colonial magistrates and administrators treated 
what they called “Hindu law” and “customary law” as if it were the com-
mon law of those countries. It is also implicit in Loos’ discussion of the 
“Islamic law” applied in the southern provinces of Thailand, which still is 
reliant on translations of texts made by British and Dutch colonial officials 
in the nineteenth century. 
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